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CIVIL PROCEDURE-CONCEPTS OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEFORE AND
AFTER SHAFFER V. HEITNER
I. INTRODUCTION
The United State Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v.
Heitnerl marked the most important development in personal ju-
risdiction analysis since 1877 when Pennoyer v. Neffi established
the conceptual foundation which has dominated the law of state
court jurisdiction for the past hundred years.3 The central concern
of the Pennoyer approach was the power of the court over persons
and things present within its territory; due process was to be as-
sured by allowing the court to assert jurisdiction only if the defen-
dant or his property were present in the state. A major adjustment
in jurisdictional analysis occurred with International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,I and the factors of fairness to the defendant and rea-
sonableness of the forum became significant to assertions of juris-
diction in personam. Only with Shaffer, however, was the
Pennoyer "power" framework abandoned. All assertions of state
court jurisdiction must now be based on the relationship among
the forum, the defendant, and the controversy.
II. HISTORY OF JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPS: THE LEGACY OF Pennoyer
A discussion of personal jurisdiction must inevitably begin by
reference to Pennoyer v. Neff.' In Pennoyer, Justice Field pre-
sented a conceptual system of jurisdiction, the goal of which was
to satisfy due process requirements by providing notice to the de-
fendant and by restricting state courts' power to matters of terri-
1 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3 See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 241 (1965); Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROoxLYN L. REv. 600 (1977); Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Juris-
diction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 668, 668-71 (1975);
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAav. L. REv. 909 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Jurisdiction]; Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and
the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory]. See generally A.
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLCr OF LAWS §§ 25-33 (1959); H. GOODRICH, CONcCr OF LAWS
§§ 67-79 (4thed. E. Scoles 1964); R. LEFLAR, AmmcAN CoNFucTS LAw §§ 19-55 (rev.
ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFucr OF LAws §§ 24-79 (1971).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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torial concern. Essentially, Pennoyer's holding was that an at-
tempt by a state court to render a judgment affecting the rights of
a nonresident who had not been personally served within the state,
or whose property within the state had not been brought before the
court by attachment, would constitute a violation of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 The basic premise of the
opinion, and the premise upon which the jurisdictional system
subsequently was structured, was that every state had the power
to exercise jurisdiction only over persons and property within its
territory.' Due process for the defendant would be insured by al-
lowing action against him only (1) in personam, where he was
6 Id. at 733; see Hazard, supra note 3, at 245; Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory,
supra note 3, at 726. In Shaffer, the Court provided a synopsis of Pennoyer:
Pennoyer was an ejectment action brought in federal court under the
diversity jurisdiction. Pennoyer, the defendant in that action, held the
land under a deed purchased in a sheriff's sale conducted to realize on a
judgment for attorneys' fees obtained against Neff in a previous action
by one Mitchell. At the time of Mitchell's suit in an Oregon State court,
Neff was a nonresident of Oregon. An Oregon statute allowed service by
publication on nonresidents who had property in the State, and Mitchell
had used that procedure to bring Neff before the Court. The United
States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon, in which Neff brought his
ejectment action, refused to recognize the validity of the judgment
against Neff in Mitchell's suit, and accordingly awarded the land to Neff.
[The Supreme Court] affirmed.
433 U.S. at 196-97.
7 95 U.S. at 733. The due process clause provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Pennoyer was the first case to apply the dde process clause
to personal jurisdiction. The test arrived at, however; and the language used, was
virtually identical to that of D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850), cited
in \Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720, 729. The D'Arcy decision was prior to passage of the
fourteenth amendment; there the Court found the concept of reciprocal restraints
on the states' sovereignty to be embodied in the full faith and credit clause. 52 U.S.
(11 How.) at 174-76. See Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and
the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MicH. L. Ray. 300, 303-05 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Long-Arm and Fairness].
1 95 U.S. at 722. The principles of sovereignty upon which Justice Field prem-
ised his theories in Pennoyer were primarily those developed in J. STORY, COMMEN-
TAMIES ON THE CoNmICr OF LAws (1834). Hazard, supra note 3, at 262-72; Zammit,
supra note 3, at 668-70. See generally Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HAy. L. Rv. at 24-25 (1934).
Story's theories, in turn, were adopted to a large extent from the works of the 17th
century Dutch jurist Huber. Hazard at 258-62; Zammit at 669; see Nadelmann,
Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 230, 230-34 (1961).
[Vol. 80
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present, or (2) in rem, where his property was located.' Notice
would be provided by personal service in the case of in personam
jurisdiction, or by seizure of the property in the case of in rem
jurisdiction."
The in personam-in rem distinction had been established at
common law, with the practice under the law of default judgments
of adjudicating claims against absent defendants after attaching
their property." The Pennoyer decision added to common law use
of the in personam-in rem distinction a conceptual approach, in
that the Court found the rationale behind in rem jurisdiction to be
the doctrine of power of state courts over property within their
territory, rather than an equitable evasion of creditors doctrine.,2
Though the Pennoyer Court intended the decision as a restriction
on state courts' jurisdiction, the power theory became instead the
conceptual basis for a hundred years of expanding jurisdiction.
13
The dichotomy between in personam jurisdiction and in rem
jurisdiction became more marked, as each developed with regard
to different considerations and criteria. The chronology of in
personam jurisdiction has often been referred to as an "erosion" of
1 95 U.S. at 724. In Shaffer the Court distinguishes in personam from in rem
as follows:
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's
person, the action and judgment are denominated "in personam" and can
impose a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If
jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within its terri-
tory, the action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect of a
judgment in such a case is limited to the property that supports jurisdic-
tion and does not impose a personal liability on the property owner, since
he is not before the court.
433 U.S. 199. See generally Developments-Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 919-66.
20 95 U.S. at 726-27. "If, without personal service, judgments inpersonam...
could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud and
oppression." But, "[s]ubstituted services by publication ... may be sufficient to
inform parties ... where property is once brought under the control of the court
.... The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner...
and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him [of the proceed-
ings]." Id. For a history of the notice problem prior to Pennoyer, see Hazard, supra
note 3, at 248-52.
" Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L.
Ray. 303, 303-04 (1962); Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 729. The
in personam-in rem distinction was recognized in the United States long before
Pennoyer. See, e.g., Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
" 95 U.S. at 723.
" See materials cited note 3 supra.
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Pennoyer, a development away from its basic premises." Increases
in development and activities of multi-state corporations, as well
as increases in interestate travel by the public in general, made
adherence to the strict presence theory for in personam jurisdiction
impractical as well as unduly restrictive on plaintiffs.' The
Pennoyer framework stood long intact, however, with jurisdiction
being extended in such situations by use of the fictional rationales
of "implied consent," 6 "constructive presence,""7 and "doing busi-
ness."'"
11 Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 734; see Ehrenzweig,
Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. RaV. 285 (1958);
Hazard, supra note 3, at 272-81; Smit, supra note 3, at 601-06; Developments-
Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 919-48. The "erosion" perhaps began within Penn-
oyer itself, where Justice Field recognized that some necessary litigation would
not fit into his rigid categories. He noted, for example, that cases such as divorce
actions affecting the plaintiff's personal status could be brought in the plaintiff's
home state even though the defendant could not be served there. He also recog-
nized the doctrine of "consent" of foreign corporations to be sued in states where
they do business. 95 U.S. at 733-36; 433 U.S. at 201.
11 By strict application of the territorial limitation of Pennoyer, jurisdiction
could not be obtained, for example, over a nonresident motorist who committed a
tort and then left before he could be served in the state. See Developments-
Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 919-23; Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note
3, at 734-35.
1, E.g., Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), where the Court used
the implied consent rationale in upholding an Iowa statute subjecting nonresident
securities dealers to jurisdiction for claims arising out of their local transactions;
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), upholding, in terms of implied consent, a
Massachusetts statute subjecting nonresident drivers to jurisdiction for disputes
arising out of their use of the state's highways. See Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 569, 578-82 (1958). See also Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928);
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). In Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S.
338 (1953), Justice Frankfurter commented on the development of the fiction of
implied consent:
[I]n order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into pre-
existing modes of analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect
that the reason why a non-resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdic-
tion is that the non-resident has "impliedly" consented to be sued there.
In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does not rest on
consent at all. . . . The liability rests on the inroad which the automo-
bile has made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff ....
Id. at 340-41.
'1 E.g., Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2nd Cir. 1930) (L.
Hand, J.); see Kurland, supra note 16, at 582.84.
11 E.g., Philadelphia & R. R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander,
227 U.S. 218 (1913). "A foreign corporation is amenable to process. . . only if it is
[Vol. 80
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The decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington" made
the most dramatic adjustment in the determination of when in
personam jurisdiction could be exercised. 0 The mechanical or
quantitative criteria of the presence theories were abandoned in
favor of basing the determination upon "the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."'2
To subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, "due process
require[d] only that. . . if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit [would] not offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.' "2
Although International Shoe marked a departure from the
conceptual apparatus of Pennoyer, it was not an abandonment of
it in the realm of in personam jurisdiction. It was never doubted
that actual presence satisfied due process, regardless of the
"quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and or-
derly administration of the laws .... ,,21 And, subsequent to
International Shoe, courts continued to recognize service within
the forum state as sufficient basis for inpersonam jurisdiction even
if the state had no connection with the controversy.2 International
doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant
the inference that it is present there." 243 U.S. at 265. See Kurland, supra note
16, at 584-86.
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 See 433 U.S. at 203-04; Kurland, supra note 16, at 585-93; Note, Jurisdiction:
Power Theory, supra note 3, at 735-37. See generally Developments-Jurisdiction,
supra note 3, at 923-35.
The issue in International Shoe was whether the state of Washington could
assert jurisdiction based on the company's activities in the state, to recover unpaid
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. 326 U.S. at 311.
21 326 U.S. at 319.
22 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
3 326 U.S. at 319. The minimum contacts test came into play only if the
defendant was "not present within the territory of the forum . . . ." Id. at 316.
24 "Physical presence in the state gives the state a basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the individual in any action that may be there brought
against him." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFwLrr OF LAwS § 28 Comment b (1971).
The "transient rule" embodying the pre-Pennoyer concept of "catching" the defen-
dant (see, e.g, Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870)) was unaffected by
International Shoe, and allowed jurisdiction in a state with no relationship to the
defendant or the controversy. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.
Ark. 1959), where service of process upon the defendant was effected in an airplane
over the state. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALx L.J. 289 (1956); Ross, The
Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction, 17 MwN. L. Rav. 146 (1932).
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Shoe augmented the power theory; it did not replace it.2" Chief
Justice Stone could not completely break out of the Pennoyer
framework; to him "minimum contacts" established presence for
the purposes of suit."8 In other words, it was because the minimum
contacts of a corporation made it "present" in the jurisdictional
sense that the court could exercise "power" over that corporation.
Pennoyer's conceptual framework based on territorial power
stood more firmly in the area of in rem jurisdiction." Soon after
Pennoyer, it was apparent that the theory was best suited for
courts to use as a basis for expansion of jurisdiction rather than as
a limitation to assure due process fairness. The well known case of
Harris v. Balkr extended the power theory to allow quasi in rem
jurisdiction to be based upon "presence" of the defendant's intan-
gible property within the forum." The arguments addressed by the
21 "The immediate effect of [International Shoe] ...was to increase the
ability of the state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants." 433 U.S. at 204. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs
L. Revi. 657, 657-68 (1959). See generally Seidelson, Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQ. U.
L. REv. 221 (1968); Developments-Jurisdiction,%supra note 3, at 923-35. The ex-
pansive nature of the International Shoe doctrine was evidenced by the develop-
ment of "long-arm jurisdiction" over nonresidents not personally served within the
forum state. See Developments-Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 1000-08; Note, Civil
Procedure-Jurisdiction-The West Virginia Long-Arm Statute, 79 W. VA. L. REv.
382 (1977); Comment, Long-Arm and Fairness, supra note 7, at 300, 300 n.3.
326 U.S. at 321.
See generally 433 U.S. at 205; Smit, supra note 3; Developments-Juris-
diction, supra note 3, at 948-66.
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
2 Quasi in rem is a term applied to proceedings which are not purely in rem,
but are brought against the defendant personally. "[Tihough brought against
persons, they only seek to subject certain property of those persons to the discharge
of the claims asserted. Such are actions in which property of non-residents is at-
tached and held for the discharge of debts due by them to citizens of the State
." Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187 (1886).
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated prop-
erty. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons
in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is
seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to
extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular
persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be
the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim.against him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12, (1958), cited in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199
n.17. In Shaffer the Supreme Court used the term "in rem" in place of "in rem and
quasi in rem."
In Shaffer, the Court provided a synopsis of Harris v. Balk:
Epstein, a resident of Maryland, had a claim against Balk, a resident of
[Vol. 80
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court in Harris were within the conceptual power framework, with
the case turning on a decision of where the property could be said
to be located." Functional considerations of fairness to the defen-
dant or appropriateness of the forum were overlooked.2 Once the
defendant's property was found to be located in the forum, due
process required only actual notice to the defendant.
3
Harris provided the pattern for expansion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Those arguments against assertions of quasi in rem
jurisdiction which were dealt with by the courts subsequent to
Harris did not involve challenges to the states' absolute sover-
eignty over property within the territory, but were instead ad-
dressed to issues such as whether the property (a debt or other
intangible obligation) was attachable, and where its situs was lo-
cated. 4 The case most noted as an example of extreme quasi in rem
North Carolina. Harris, another North Carolina resident, owed money to
Balk. When Harris happened to visit Maryland, Epstein garnished his
debt to Balk. Harris did not contest the debt to Balk and paid it to
Epstein's North Carolina attorney. When Balk later sued Harris in North
Carolina, [the Supreme Court] held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause . . . required that Harris' payment to Epstein be treated as a
discharge of his debt to Balk. [The] Court reasoned that the debt Harris
owed Balk was an intangible form of property belonging to Balk, and that
the location of that property traveled with the debtor. By obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over Harris, Epstein had "arrested" his debt to Balk,
198 U.S., at 223, and brought it into the Maryland court. Under the
structure established by Pennoyer, Epstein was then entitled to proceed
against that debt to vindicate his claim against Balk, even though Balk
himself was not subject to the jurisdiction of a Maryland tribunal.
433 U.S. at 200-01.
11 198 U.S. at 221-22; see Hazard, supra note 3, at 278-79; Note, Jurisdiction:
Power Theory, supra note 3, at 732-33.
12 See Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 733.
[Under the Harris approach] any consideration of fairness to the defen-
dant and appropriateness of Maryland as a forum ... was irrelevant,
because under the Pennoyer system of concepts Maryland was exercising
power over the debt which was fictionally within its borders, not over the
absent defendant who was beyond the "power" of that state.
Id. See also Seidelson, Seider v. Roth, et seq.: The Urge Toward Reason and the
Irrational Ratio Decidendi, 39 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 42, 43-47 (1970).
3 The Court in Harris put the burden of notification upon the garnishee (the
holder of the "attached" debt). "[Want of notification . . . has . . . an effect
upon the right of the garnishee to avail himself of the prior judgment and his
payment thereunder .... [N]otification by the garnishee is for the purpose of
making sure that his creditor shall have an opportunity to defend the claim. ...
Fair dealing requires this ... ." 198 U.S. at 227.
34E.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906); Steele v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Podolsky v.
7
Showen: Civil Procedure--Concepts of Personal Jurisdiction before and aft
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction was Seider v. Roth,35 in which the New York Court of
Appeals allowed jurisdiction to be based on attachment of a debt
owed to the defendant in the form of a contingent contractual
obligation of his insurance company to defend and indemnify him.
Again the arguments addressed were within the Pennoyer-Harris
power framework; the basic concern in Seider was whether the
purported intangible property did in fact exist." Such assertions
of quasi in rem jurisdiction were much criticized for their failure
to consider the relationship among the forum, the defendant, and
the controversy-those factors deemed by International Shoe and
subsequent in personam decisions to be essential to due process in
forums where the defendant was absent."
Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in
Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939), and cases cited
therein.
- 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). See Seidelson, supra note 32; Siegel,
Jurisdiction Ad Infinitum: New York's "Rem" Seizure of the Insurance Policy for
Jurisdiction in Accident Cases, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 99 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction
by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1075 (1968); Zammit,
supra note 3, at 671; Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 744-53;
Comment, Attachment of "Obiigations"--A New Chapter in Long-Arm
Jurisdiction, 16 BuFFALO L. REv. 769 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Attachment]; Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles; Contingent Obligations and
the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLum. L. Rav. 550 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm and
Fairness, supra note 7, at 325-33.
3 The whole question . . . is whether Hartford's contractual obliga-
tion to defendant is a debt or cause of action such as may be attached.
The Hartford policy . . . requires Hartford . . . to defend [co-
defendant] Lemiux in any automobile negligence action and, if judgment
be rendered against Lemiux, to indemnify him therefor. Thus, as soon as
the accident occurred there was imposed on Hartford a contractual obli-
gation which should be considered a "debt" . - . .
17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314. Judge Burke, dissenting, argued that
the so-called 'debt' . . . is a mere promise made to the nonresident in.
sured [Lemiux] by the foreign insurance carrier to defend and indemnify
, * * if a suit is commenced and damages are awarded against the in-
sured. . . . It is exactly this type of contingent undertaking which does
not fall within the definition of attachable debt ....
Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315. See Seidelson, supra note 32, at 51-53; Siegel, supra
note 35, at 102-03; Comment, Long-Arm and Fairness, supra note 7, at 325-33. See
generally Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 744-65; 61 MINN. L.
REV. 158 (1966); 19 STAN. L. RFv. 654 (1967).
11 See Zammit, supra note 3, at 671-77; Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory,
supra note 3, at 739-40; Comment, Attachment, supra note 35, at 773-77; Comment,
Long-Arm and Fairness, supra note 7, at 333. See generally Hazard, supra note 3,
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In Hanson v. Dencklas the Supreme Court analyzed the pos-
sibility of both in rem and in personam jurisdiction. The in
personam analysis became a refinement upon International Shoe
with the additional requirement that the defendant had purposely
availed himself of privileges in the state where jurisdiction was
being sought." But the in rem analysis remained consistent with
previously discussed decisions and the issue was where the prop-
erty could be said to be located." There have, on the other hand,
been "[w]ell-reasoned lower court opinions"4' which have ques-
tioned the proposition that presence of property in a state gives
that state jurisdiction regardless of the relationship of the property
owner and the dispute to the forum. In Atkinson v. Superior
Court,42 for example, the California Supreme Court founded juris-
diction upon the attachment of intangible obligations only after
deciding that due process as defined by International Shoe had
been satisfied. 3 Although some states had thus narrowed the per-
missible scope of quasi in rem jurisdiction, the Constitutional lim-
its as defined by the Supreme Court prior to Shaffer v. Heitner"
permitted state court jurisdiction to be asserted anywhere the de-
fendant was actually present or had "minimum contacts," and
anywhere that any of his property including intangible obligations,
could be said to be located.
III. Shaffer v. Heitner
Shaffer v. Heitner" presented the Supreme Court with a situa-
tion which amply revealed the possible extent of the unfairness
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 253.
' Id. at 246-49.
433 U.S. at 205. See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3rd
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908; Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123,
1130-43 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 258,
401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); Camire v. Scieszka, 358
A.2d 397 (N.H. 1976). See also Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 122 (2nd
Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
13 "The relevant contacts with this state are significant ... in deciding
whether due process permits exercising . . . quasi in rem jurisdiction . . . ." Id.
at 346, 316 P.2d at 965 (Traynor, J.). In Atkinson, the action arose out of the
defendant's contact with the state, and the attached intangible was the subject
matter of the litigation. See Traynor, supra note 25, at 662-63; Note, Jurisdiction:
Power Theory, supra note 3, at 741-42, 763.
4 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
45Id.
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inherent in asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction as it had developed
within the Pennoyer-Harris framework. The action was a share-
holder's derivative suit filed in the Court of Chancery for New
Castle County, Delaware, by appellee Heitner, a nonresident of
Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corpora-
tion, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Arizona. Named as defendants were Greyhound, its wholly owned
subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight officers or
directors of the corporations."6 The allegation was essentially that
the individual defendants had violated their duties to Greyhound
by causing it to engage in unlawful activities in Oregon which
resulted in liability for substantial damages in a private anti-trust
suit47 and a fine in a criminal contempt action. 8 Heitner filed with
his complaint a motion for an order of sequestration of Delaware
property of the individual defendants. The sequestration proce-
dure was to compel the appearance of the individual defendants,
who were not residents of Delaware." The motion was granted and
the sequestrator seized approximately 82,000 shares of common
stock in Greyhound owned by nineteen of the defendants, and
stock options belonging to two others." Although no certificates
11 Id. at 189-90.
4 Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977),
resulted in a judgment of $13,146,090, plus attorneys' fees of $1,250,000, plus costs,
against Greyhound.
41 United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973), 370 F.
Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974), resulted in fines of
$600,000.
4, DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975). This statute provides in part as follows:
If it appears in any complaint ... that the defendant ... is a nonresi-
dent of the State, the Court may make an order directing such nonresi-
dent defendant or defendants to appear .... The Court may compel the
appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his
property, which property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay
the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise
defaults. Any defendant whose property shall have been so seized and
who shall have entered a general appearance in the cause may, upon
notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court for an order releasing such
property .... The Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff
shall satisfy the Court that because of other circumstances there is a
reasonable possibility that such release may render it substantially less
likely that plaintiff will obtain satisfaction of any judgment secured.
Id. For a discussion and critique of the Delaware procedure, see Folk & Moyer,
Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 CoLUm. L. RPv. 749
(1973).
1 "These seizures were accomplished by placing 'stop transfer' orders or their
equivalents on the books of the Gieyhound Corp." 433 U.S. at 192.
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representing the property were physically present, the stock was
found to be located in Delaware by virtue of a Delaware statute
providing that "the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of
all corporations existing under the laws of this State. . .shall be
regarded as in this State."'" The twenty-one defendants (the appel-
lants) entered a special appearance to move that service of process
be quashed and the sequestration order be vacated. They con-
tended that the property was not capable of attachment in Dela-
ware, that the procedure did not provide due process of law, and
that personal jurisdiction could not be sustained because of lack
of sufficient contacts to satisfy the rule of International Shoe. The
Court of Chancery 2 rejected these arguments, stating that seques-
tration was a proper procedure to compel the personal appearance
of a nonresident defendant, that due process was not violated since
the property would be held only until the defendants entered a
general appearance, and that the statutory situs of the stock pro-
vided a sufficient basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this judg-
ment.13 Their opinion dealt primarily with their rejection of the
appellants' contention that the sequestration procedure was incon-
sistent with the due process requirements of notice and hearing
prior to taking." The court bluntly rejected the argument that
jurisdiction should not be maintained because of lack of minimum
contacts:
"1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975). This section is only for the purposes of
"title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction. . . not for the purpose
of taxation." Id.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that this section did not supply the
minimum contacts necessary to support jurisdiction in a sequestration proceeding.
Request for certiorari was pending at the time the Shaffer decision was decided,
and was subsequently denied. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
8" The Court of Chancery issued a letter opinion. 433 U.S. at 193.
13 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
- Id. at 230-236. The Delaware court concluded that the due process require-
ments set forth in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969), were inapplicable because of the limitation on the purpose and length of
time of the sequestration. The Delaware court relied, 361 A.2d at 228, 230-31, on
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). 433 U.S. at 194, n.10. For a discussion and
critique of the "Ownbey exception" to the due process requirements of the
Sniadach line of cases, see Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process
Requirements, 82 Ymz L.J. 1023 (1973).
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There are significant constitutional questions at issue here
but we say at once that we do not deem the rule of International
Shoe to be one of them. . . .The reason, of course, is that
jurisdiction under [the Delaware sequestration statute] re-
mains quasi in rem founded on the presence of capital stock
here, not on prior contact by defendants with this forum ...
Delaware may constitutionally establish situs of such shares
here ....
The United States Supreme Court reversed." After stating the
facts, Justice Marshall began the majority opinion by noting that
the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis assumed "the continued
soundness of the conceptual structure founded on the century-old
case of Pennoyer v. Neff."'" Justice Marshall followed with a his-
tory of jurisdictional analysis, with emphasis on the major concep-
tual developments." The conclusion reached was that "the law of
state court jurisdiction no longer stands securely on the foundation
established in Pennoyer," and that "the time is ripe to consider
whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth
in International Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem as
well as in personam."59
Justice Marshall presented what he termed the "simple and
straightforward"" case for applying the fair play and substantial
justice test to jurisdiction in rem. The argument's basic premise
was not a new idea, but simply a recognition that all jurisdictional
approaches, regardless of their labels, are ultimately assertions of
jurisdiction over the interests and rights of persons.6 ' Since the
361 A.2d at 229.
433 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 196-206. Justice Marshall discussed mainly the doctrines and princi-
ples of Pennoyer, Harris v. Balk, and International Shoe.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
" "All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons." Tyler v. Court
of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Holmes, C.J.), appeal dismissed
179 U.S. 405 (1900). Previous Supreme Court decisions holding that property could
not be subjected to a court's judgment unless reasonable efforts had been made to
give the owners actual notice recognized that an adverse judgment in rem directly
affected the property owner's rights. 433 U.S. at 206. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City
of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The
premise was impliedly recognized within Pennoyer itself, with the requirement of
notice and the fictional equation of "seizure" with "notice." 95 U.S. at 726-27. See
Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 731. See also von Mehren &
[Vol. 80
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minimum contacts standard of International Shoe is the proper
one for the determination of whether an assertion of jurisdiction
over the interests of persons satisfies the due process clause, it
followed that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."6
Justice Marshall pointed out that many types of actions typi-
cally brought in rem will still be allowed under the new test, since
the presence of property can provide the sufficient "contacts
among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation" to sat-
isfy the International Shoe standard." Examples of such actions
are controversies concerning ownership of property located in the
forum, and also those concerning rights and obligations of such
ownership." What will be different about such exercises of jurisdic-
tion is the analytical approach. Jurisdiction will be permissible in
such cases not because of the state's power over property within
its territory, but only because the forum, the defendant, and the
controversy are related. What will make such assertions of jurisdic-
tion reasonable is not presence of property, but the typical mini-
mum contacts factors: the defendant's expectation of benefit from
the state, the state's interest in assuring marketability of property,
and the likelihood that important records and witnesses can be
found in the state."
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. Rv.
1121, 1135-36 (1966).
11 433 U.S. at 212. International Shoe and its "progeny" provide a well devel-
oped body of law now relevant to evaluating all assertions of state court jurisdiction.
E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Traveler's
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482
(E.D. Il. 1959); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1
(1959) (Traynor, J.). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MxuzmE, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1067-69, 1073 (1969); Kurland, supra note 16, at 593-624;
Developments-Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 919-35; Note, Jurisdiction over For-
eign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 381 (1955);
Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IowA L. Rav. 345
(1959). Although the International Shoe analysis is one typically applied to corpora-
tions, there is no reason it cannot be used to evaluate jurisdiction over natural
persons as well. 433 U.S. at 204 n.19.
a 433 U.S. at 207-08.
" Thus, jurisdiction will still be permissible in most of those cases which have
typically been considered true in rem actions, and quasi in rem actions of the first
type (see note 29, supra). Id. at 207-08 & n.24.
a Id. at 208. In most such cases there has been no real need to rely on the
property to justify jurisdiction, as the presence of the property would typically
13
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What will not be acceptable under the new analysis will be the
type of quasi in rem jurisdiction asserted in Harris v. Balk and the
present case, where the property was completely unrelated to the
cause of action and served only to provide the basis for bringing
the defendant into court. "In such cases, if a direct assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Consti-
tution, it would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction
should be equally impermissible.""
The new approach will not allow a potential defendant to
avoid his obligations by removing his assets to a place where he is
not subject to an in personam suit. The full faith and credit
clause17 makes valid in personam judgments enforceable in all
states.68 Also, as Justice Marshall pointed out, "a State in which
property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that prop-
erty, by use of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being
sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained consis-
tently with International Shoe."" Justice Marshall also addressed
the argument that to allow in rem jurisdiction would avoid "the
uncertainty inherent in the International Shoe standard. . .. ""
He stated the Court's belief that the standard could be easily
applied in most cases, and in any case, "the cost of simplifying the
litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the sacri-
fice of 'fair play and substantial justice.' That cost is too high."7'
Finally, Justice Marshall dealt with the argument that juris-
diction over the appellants should have been maintained on the
basis of minimum contacts . 2 He rejected this argument, finding
that the appellants "simply had nothing to do with the State of
indicate the existence of sufficient contacts under International Shoe. Id. at 209,
n.31. See generally Carrington, supra note 11.
"4 433 U.S. at 209.
17 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Is 433 U.S. at 210. See note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 734
n.35. "Enforcement of foreign judgments was often difficult during the infant years
of the full faith and credit clause. Thus, the litigational convenience of proceeding
in the state where the assets were located. . . promoted the practice of commenc-
ing suits by attaching the defendant's property." Id. See 433 U.S. at 210 n.35; von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 61, at 1178.
433 U.S. at 210.
' Id. at 211.
71 Id. This argument, in essence, has been made previously by comentators.
See note 37 supra; Carrington, supra note 11, at 307-09; Developments-Jurs-
diction, supra note 3, at 938-39.
,1 433 U.S. at 213-16.
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Delaware," nor any "reason to expect to be haled before a Dela-
ware court."7
Justices Powell and Stevens each concurred separately in
short opinions." Justice Brennan also concurred in the majority
opinion, except for the ruling that the appellants did not have the
necessary minimum contacts with Delaware.75 He believed this
ruling to be a pure advisory opinion since jurisdiction had been
based solely on the quasi in rem concept, and the existence of
minimum contacts had not been pleaded by the appellee nor ruled
on by the Delaware courts.7" Justice Brennan nevertheless ex-
pressed his view that jurisdiction could be maintained in this case
by application of the International Shoe standard. He emphasized
the state's interest in providing a forum for litigating claims in-
volving management of its domestic corporations, and the fact that
the appellants voluntarily associated themselves with the state by
entering into a relationship with one of its corporations, thus in-
voking the benefits of the state's laws.77
IV. THE IMPACT OF Shaffer ON JuISDIsTIoNAL ANALYsIs
Although only time will tell what impact the Shaffer opinion
will have on jurisdictional concepts, something of its intended
scope can be discerned from the opinion's analytical approach.
The decision was unanimous in holding that the statutory presence
of a nonresident's shares of stock within the forum state cannot,
consistent with the due process, serve as a basis for jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims against him, with judgment enforceable against
any of his assets. The statutory presence of a nonresident's shares
of stock, in combination with Delaware's refusal to allow the defen-
dant to defend on the merits without subjecting himself to unlim-
ited liability, presented a situation where quasi in rem jurisdiction
appeared particularly harsh and extreme.7" Thus, a very limited
interpretation could be given to the Shaffer holding, that is, that
due process was denied only if the assets attached were intangibles
unknowingly located in the forum, or only if the defendant was
denied a limited appearance. Such an interpretation was suggested
' Id. at 216.
' Id. at 217-19.
7' Id. at 219-20.
71 Id. at 220.
71 Id. at 222-28.
7' See id. at 217-219 (Stevens, J., concurring); 91 HARv. L. Rav. 152, 157-58
(1977).
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in the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens, and
would involve little or no disruption of the basic conceptual frame-
work of Pennoyer and Harris .
7
Such an interpretation would be untenable, however, in light
of the theoretical approach and reasoning of the majority opinion.
The opinion marked the complete abandonment of Pennoyer and
could serve as the new conceptual foundation of personal jurisdic-
tion. Pennoyer required that jurisdiction be based on the court's
territorial power; International Shoe allowed satisfaction of this
requirement for in personam jurisdiction to be based on
"minimum contacts." Now, Shaffer requires that all assertions of
state court jurisdiction, in personam or in rem, be based on the
International Shoe standards, that is, the relationship among the
forum, the defendant, and the controversy. 0 Territorial power is
now not only non-essential for the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
but it is also not sufficient. In other words, territorial power is
irrelevant to assertions of jurisdiction under this theory. The mere
presence of the defendant or his property in the forum, with no
further connection between his activities or property in that forum
and the controversy, would be insufficient to support jurisdiction.
To support this theory, Shaffer must be analyzed as follows:
1. Shaffer holds that presence of property in a state does not
automatically confer to that state's courts jurisdiction over the
owner's interest in that property.8
11 Justice Powell reserved judgment in the case of real property, where
"preservation of the common-law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably
would avoid the uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard. . . ."433
U.S. at 217. Justice Stevens agreed on this point, and concurred primarily because
of the "risk of judgment without notice" aspect of the Delaware sequestration
procedure. Id. at 21749.
Id. at 204, 212.
" Id. at 211-12.
Although the theory that territorial power is both essential to and suffi-
cient for jurisdiction has been undermined, we have never held that the
presence of property in a State does not automatically confer jurisdiction
over the owner's interest in that property. This history [of jurisdiction]
must be considered as supporting the proposition that jurisdiction based
solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of due process
, * * but it is not decisive. "[Traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" can be ... offended by the perpetuation of ancient
forms .... The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is
anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property
supports an ancient form without substantial modem justification. Its
continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction
[Vol. 80
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2. By implication this rejects the most basic principle of
Pennoyer-the exclusive sovereignty of a state over persons and
property within its territory.
3. Without this principle of "exclusive sovereignty," there is
no more "power theory," and presence alone, of person or property,
can never be enough to confer jurisdiction.82
This analysis is supported by Justice Marshall's statement in
Shaffer that the decision is not confined to assertions of jurisdic-
tion quasi in rem based on intangible property, but includes "all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction. . . ."' It is also supported
by the fact that one of the Court's main objections to the type of
quasi in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk and the Shaffer
situation is that the property serving as the jurisdictional basis was
completely unrelated to the cause of action." This objection would
apply equally to any jurisdiction based on presence alone.,
The ultimate conclusion of this analysis could be stated in
terms of "general" and. "specific" jurisdiction." "General" juris-
diction would no longer be a valid concept. All assertions of juris-
diction must be based on the relationship of the forum, the defen-
dant, and the cause of action, that is, "specific" jurisdiction.
The analysis could also mark a step, although not necessarily
an inevitable or desired step, toward convergence of the test of
jurisdiction and the tests of forum non conveniens,87 and absorp-
that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
Id. See 91 HARV. L. Rlv. at 158-59.
" Thus, the deep-rooted "transient rule," supra note 24, can be presumed
dead.
433 U.S. at 212.
Id. at 208-09.
91 HARV. L. Rv. at 159.
For a complete discussion of the "general-specific" jurisdictional analysis,
see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 61, at 1136-79.
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and the underlying
controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect
to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction.
On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to exercise
power to adjudicate any kind of controvery when jurisdiction is based on
relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the person or
persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we call general jurisdic-
tion.
Id. at 1136.
8 The doctrine of forum non conveniens "is patterned upon the right of the
court . . . to refuse the imposition upon its jurisdiction . . . if it appears that for
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tion of the choice of law tests." In his dissent, Justice Brennan
expressed his view that the jurisdictional and choice of law inquir-
ies are often closely related and dependent on similar considera-
tions."8 The majority opinion, however, rejects the argument that
conflicts of law issues are appropriate to jurisdictional analysis,
and quotes from Hanson v. Denckla: "The issue is personal juris-
diction, not choice of law.""
Conceptually, the Shaffer decision does require a major ad-
justment in how one must approach jurisdiction. Most courts,
however, will undoubtedly approach the problem of application of
the Shaffer principles in a much less theoretical manner, To begin
with, in most cases where the defendant and his property will be
present, the relationship among him, the forum, and the contro-
versy will be obvious to the extent that jurisdictional analysis will
not likely be contemplated. The notion of power over whatever and
whoever is present could thus be perpetuated.
More important, however, is the question as to the ultimate
invalidity of the "general" jurisdiction concept. What would be
unfair about allowing a defendant to be sued where his contacts
are extensive-in his domicile or state of citizenship--on any claim
against him? If the defendant consented, there would be no due
process argument raised.8 If he objected, however, on the grounds
the convenience of litigants and witnesses and in the interest of justice the action
should be instituted in another forum where the action might have been brought."
BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 783 (4th ed. 1951).
81 See Traynor, supra note 25, at 663-64.
It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem
and in personam, high time now in a mobile society where property
increasingly becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes stranger
and stranger. Insofar as courts remain given to asking "Res, res-who's
got the res?," they cripple their evaluation of the real factors that should
determine jurisdiction. They cannot evaluate the real factors squarely
until they give up the ghost of the res. As they do so, the gap will narrow
between the tests of jurisdiction and the tests of forum non conveniens.
With these converging, we can expect them to absorb choice-of-law tests.
This is eminently sound, for the state whose law controls is the one whose
courts are best qualified to interpret and apply it.
Id. See also Carrington, supra note 11, at 311; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
61, at 1128-34; Note, Jurisdiction: Power Theory, supra note 3, at 764-65.
433 U.S. at 224-25.
O Id. at 215 (quoting 357 U.S. at 254). The same dispute split the Court in
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 258 (Black, J., joined by Brennan and Burton, JJ., dissenting).
11 If jurisdiction is consented to by the defendant, it presumably still can be
exercised by a forum with no real relationship to the defendant or the controversy.
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that the controversy was totally elsewhere and it would be unfair
in some way to subject him to suit in his own state (for example,
he may have problems of evidence, witnesses), then by strict appli-
cation of the Shaffer theory the factor of the relationship between
the forum and the controversy would have to be taken into consid-
eration. Justice Marshall did reiterate in Shaffer the language
from Hanson v. Denckla that the state would "not acquire...
jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or
the most convenient location for litigation. 9 2 This would be a
proper argument for a defendant to make when the asserted juris-
diction seems unfair in light of the relationship among the forum,
himself, and the controversy. It would not, however, be a logical
argument for a plaintiff to make in attempting to gain jurisdiction
elsewhere than the "center of gravity," because the due process
issue in personal jurisdiction is one of fairness to the defendant. 3
Another problem could be the possibility of unavailability to
the plaintiff of a proper (by the Shaffer evaluation) forum. Justice
Marshall specified that- Shaffer "did not raise, and we therefore
have not considered, the question whether the presence of a defen-
dant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff."" From the conceptual
viewpoint, an allowance of such jurisdiction based on presence
would best be termed a "necessary exception" to the rule of
Shaffer. The overriding consideration of fairness to the defendant
must necessarily be tempered by the consideration of necessity of
some forum for the plaintiff. 5
Courts may also find it desirable in some situations to allow
jurisdiction based upon some strong interest in providing a partic-
ular citizen with a forum, such as the state's interest in providing
a convenient forum for tort victims who otherwise might become
public wards. Such considerations could perhaps be fit into the
Shaffer formula as stated by Justice Brennan; his statement of the
rule would allow consideration of the contacts of the parties." To
This necessarily results from the fact that the jurisdictional determination contin-
ues to be considered to be embodied in the due process clause. See 433 U.S. at 216.
0 Id. at 215 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254).
"3 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945).
433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
" See Smit, supra note 3, at 608-10; 91 HARV. L. REv. at 161-62. See generally
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 61, at 1127-28.
" 91 HAnv. L. Rzv. at 162 n.62, see Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123,
1142 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
6 433 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). "The primary
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allow such jurisdiction, however, would also best be termed an
exception of the rule as stated and discussed in the majority opin-
ion, with its overriding emphasis on contacts of the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
With the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court
established a method of jurisdictional analysis embodying as its
central premise the long recognized fact that all judicial proceed-
ings are ultimately concerned with interests of persons. Abandoned
was the categorical analysis established by Pennoyer v. Neff, along
with its concern with state courts' "power," a concept which had
become "embodied in the very vocabulary"9 used to describe
courts' actions and judgments. Those terms-in personam, in rem,
quasi in rem-are now meaningless, except in an historical con-
text, as methods of asserting jurisdiction. There remains only one
proper method for state courts to assert jurisdiction over persons.
That method involves an evaluation according to the standards of
International Shoe and its progeny, with a goal of "fair play and
substantial justice."99
James E. Showen
teaching of. .. today's decision is that a State, in seeking to assert jurisdiction
over a person located outside its borders, may only do so on the basis of minimum
contacts among the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum state." Id.
aId. at 199.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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